WILL SRI LANKA TAKE
ITS SECOND CHANCE?
Dr. Jehan Perera hopes that the political leadership of the entire country
will take the opportunity to build a bright future out of the tsunami disaster.

n the first few days after the tsunami disaster struck, numerous stories came to light about abuse in welfare centres housing refugees – including corruption, theft and even child molestation. On the face of it, the Sri Lankan government’s decision to place all welfare centres in both the north-east and the south under army control is both rational and justifiable in terms of efficiency. In most countries, when disasters of enormous magnitude strike, it is the military that is brought in to restore order. The military is a tightly organised institution, able to withstand catastrophes and act with discipline in emergency situations.
However, underlying the government’s motivation in bringing in the army was another important factor: politics. This was seen in the attempts by the LTTE in the north-east, and by the JVP in the south, to claim credit for the relief that was being delivered to the welfare centres. The irony was particularly acute in the case of the JVP. It is the second-largest constituent party in the government coalition. However, it is a marriage of convenience, as the JVP and the rest of the coalition partners are actually fierce rivals.
The LTTE and JVP thrusts into the welfare centres raised the possibility of the dominant political party – the PA, which is headed by President Chandrika Kumaratunga – being edged out of obtaining the full measure of political credit for whatever relief effort had taken place. In the case of the LTTE in the north-east, the situation was even more serious. With governance in the conflict zones of the north-east very shaky, the system of dual power that currently exists there threatened to tilt in the direction of the LTTE.
The horrific deaths of so many and the vast destruction have exhausted the desire of people to continue with any ethnic conflicts, as they have to face the greater battle to rebuild their shattered lives. Together with religious leaders, most people would note that the tsunami did not have any regard for any man-made barriers. But floods do not dissolve political or military boundaries. While most people of goodwill would hope that the leaders of the government and the LTTE cooperate with each other to bring maximum relief to the affected people in the aftermath of the tsunami disaster, the separation between the government and LTTE-controlled areas persists, as it did before the tsunami.
One of the most important questions that has arisen in the aftermath of the tsunami disaster is its impact on the peace process. The attention of most people – including peace activists, in the initial phase – was rightly focused on coping with the aftermath of the disaster. However, in the longer term, the question of the peace process will need to be frontally addressed once again.
The government and the LTTE are the two actors whose decisions will have the greatest impact on the long-term prospects of the people and the entire country. At one level, there are positive signs. In an unprecedented offer, President Chandrika Kumaratunga invited the LTTE’s political wing leader, S. P. Tamilchelvam, to join a task force that would include Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe. What was novel about this offer was that it could have brought the LTTE into the centre of governmental debate and decision making on the response of the tsunami disaster.
However, the LTTE rejected this presidential invitation. This could be due to the LTTE’s lack of faith that the task force would actually achieve nothing. The history of government is full of task forces that do little and accomplish even less. The LTTE’s rejection of the president’s offer could also be due to the LTTE’s ideological unwillingness to accept that it is merely one of many actors. This would probably be the more important reason. The LTTE’s self-perception is that of leadership and of being the sole representative of the ‘Tamil nation’, which position it jealously guards.
The LTTE’s mindset that it is the sole representative of the ‘Tamil nation’ could also be the reason for its decision that any relief to the LTTE-controlled areas should be channelled through the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation, its NGO arm. This is exactly what the government has replicated in its areas of control, by giving control to the army. The stated justification for restricting relief measures through a single agency would be to streamline the relief efforts and to minimise duplication and confusion in the delivery of aid. However, experience from other parts of the world would suggest that when everything has to be channelled through one agency, there is overload on that single agency – even if it is a very capable one.
The real challenge for both the government and the LTTE is yet to come. The task of providing emergency relief is considerably different to reconstructing villages and towns. Armies can provide emergency relief to people. This is why the US and Indian armed forces have offered emergency relief help to Sri Lanka and other affected countries in the region. There is no doubt that the government and the LTTE’s armed forces are doing an efficient job of providing emergency relief to the people. However, engaging in the longer-term reconstruction work will be another matter.
The manner in which the government and the LTTE handle the question of emergency relief will determine the next phase of the peace process. At the present time, it appears that the government and the LTTE intend to work separately to provide relief to the people. If that is so, then systems and modes of thought will be set in motion that will make it inevitable that the reconstruction phase will also take place separately. The question for the LTTE, however, would be to obtain external funds for the massive amount of reconstruction that is necessary. Expatriate Tamil funding will no doubt come directly to the LTTE. But if the LTTE is to access foreign governmental and multilateral donor funding for reconstruction, it will have to work through the Sri Lankan government.
The international aid system works through governments when it comes to large-scale economic assistance. This means that the unprecedented aid that countries such as Japan, Norway, the US, India and the UK are putting at the disposal of tsunami-affected countries will be channelled through governments. The last three named countries have bans on the LTTE. It is extremely unlikely that these powerful countries will permit funds for reconstruction to go direct to the LTTE. If the LTTE wishes to see the north-east rebuilt – after 20 years of war as well as the tsunami – it has to be prepared to work in partnership with the government.
Unfortunately, the present political situation does not appear to be conductive to such cooperation and partnership. Since the election to office of the UPFA government in April 2004, there has been a deadlock – if not deterioration – in the peace process. The government and the LTTE have not been able to make the compromises that are necessary for them to take the peace process forward. They are not even dealing with each other in a problem-solving manner. They both seem to have definite political agendas that make it difficult for them to compromise. Instead of compromising, they each prefer to point the finger at the other for being intransigent. As a result, the trust and respect that the government and the LTTE have for each other is eroded further.
The main area of contestation remains the vexed one of power sharing. For its part, the LTTE has been very specific and concrete in proposing a detailed mechanism of an Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA). The LTTE has stated that the government has been vague in its response and has called for a definite consensus within the government coalition prior to a resumption of peace talks. Cooperation on the ground between the government and the LTTE in delivering immediate humanitarian relief to the tsunami-affected people – and the learning and goodwill that comes out of it – could provide a clue to the way forward.
Sometimes answers to problems that cannot be worked out in theoretical discussions can get sorted out in practical realities. But this does require political will at the highest level. The rewards will be substantial. The international community has granted a substantial amount of relief assistance that would need to be delivered in an effective manner to the needy people. These funds and material need to find mechanisms to deliver them to the affected people.
With the tsunami disaster has also come Sri Lanka’s second chance for rapid progression out of underdevelopment and conflict. Now, once again, with the tsunami disaster, Sri Lanka has become a centre of international attention and goodwill. There is enormous potential to tap into international resources that could transform this country in terms of development. The question is whether our country’s political leaders can put their differences behind them and present a unified stance to the LTTE with regard to a just solution to the ethnic conflict and the aspirations of the Tamil people.
If they do, Sri Lanka will be able to build a bright new future out of the tragedy of the present.