CONSOLIDATING AGREEMENTS
WITH OPPOSITION HELP
The result of the recent local-government elections can strengthen
the peace process, writes Dr. Jehan Perera.

he verdict of the local-government election has been a triumph for President Mahinda Rajapakse. He has shown that he is capable of achieving what he promised he would do. He has revived the fortunes of the SLFP as a single party. His moderate stand on the peace process also stands vindicated by the election results. The fact is that local-government elections in Sri Lanka have seldom been limited to matters of local concern. Due to the relatively compact nature of the polity, local elections have invariably had election campaigns with national themes.

One of the main themes at the recent election was the peace process. This accounts for the statements and demonstrations by the JVP and the JHU against key aspects of the current peace process. During its election campaign, the JVP publicly criticised the government for entering into an agreement with the LTTE in Geneva, in February 2006, to uphold and respect the Norwegian-facilitated ceasefire agreement of February 2002. The JVP issued a call for the Norwegian facilitators to be removed from their role by the end of next month. It has also threatened public demonstrations against the peace process.

The election results show that whatever support the JVP has from the people is not primarily due to its stand on the peace process, but is due to the poverty and hopelessness that afflicts their lives. The party in question has always stood for the economic rights of the marginalised in society. The JVP offers people who are left out of the modern economy and its fruits the promise of a better future. Its largely youthful cadre is highly motivated and speaks in simple language that makes sense to the poverty-stricken masses, especially to those of the younger generation who are looking for a quick fix for their woes. They will probably be more hardworking and less corrupt than the politicians from the established parties.

It would be a distortion of reality if anyone were to interpret the election results as a popular vote against the peace process. The president will need to stand firm on the course he has embarked upon, with the confidence that the people’s support for the peace process continues to be strong. One of his many challenges will be to continue to take the Sinhalese nationalist sections of the people, as represented by the JVP and the JHU, along with him on the difficult journey to peace with the LTTE. What has made the peace process initiated by Rajapakse different from those that came before is its inclusive approach. The president has done his utmost to take the Sinhalese nationalist parties along with him in making peace with the LTTE.

The pragmatism of the president’s inclusive approach is especially borne out by a comparison of the peace processes conducted by the former UNP government. The Sinhalese nationalist parties were not consulted at all by then Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. His approach to ethnic-conflict resolution was that the decisions needed to be taken by the government and LTTE, and it was these two parties that had to take primary responsibility for the peace process. Wickremesinghe did not have much time or interest in what is known as ‘track two’ and ‘track three’ approaches, in which the opposition parties and civil society also contribute actively to the peace process.

DANGEROUS EXCLUSION: In retrospect, there is no doubt that Wickremesinghe’s ‘track-one’ focus was effective in delivering the ceasefire agreement, which has proved to be the mainstay of the current peace process. But the limitation of the track-one approach in generating a wider consensus on the peace process was soon to be seen. As they were clearly excluded from the peace process, the Sinhalese nationalist parties felt no restraint whatsoever in engaging in anti-peace campaigns and staging public demonstrations in opposition to the peace process. Their visible expressions of anger against the peace process, as well as LTTE violations of the ceasefire agreement, were transmitted by media imagery and direct campaigning to undermine the confidence of the general population in the peace process.

The negative experience of former president Chandrika Kumaratunga in attempting to establish the landmark P-TOMS joint mechanism along with the LTTE is yet another example of the difficulty inherent in taking the peace process forward in the face of open opposition by Sinhalese nationalist parties. Kumaratunga’s government did not capitulate despite the death fasts by members of the Buddhist clergy and violent demonstrations by the Sinhalese nationalist parties. But the anti-P-TOMS campaign by the Sinhalese nationalist opposition had the effect of turning public opinion against the joint tsunami mechanism. Thereafter, Rajapakse was skilful in utilising the anti-P-TOMS sentiment among the general population to his political advantage by promising to abrogate the agreement.

What this analysis demonstrates is that taking the peace process forward in the face of open opposition by the Sinhalese nationalist parties is a very difficult venture. These parties have shown themselves to be adept in tapping into the fears and nationalist impulses of the Sinhalese people. This explains Rajapakse’s desire to keep these Sinhalese nationalist parties as his allies, even while taking the peace process forward in a pragmatic manner. But the price to be paid will necessarily be a slowing down of the forward movement of the peace process due to the exigencies of coalition politics and contrasting ideologies of peace.

POSITIVE ROLE: The danger, however, is that slow-moving peace processes do not fit well with the agendas of militant organisations. In this context, a comparative view of other peace processes from other parts of the world would suggest that there is a positive role that the major opposition party and civil society can play in speeding up the peace process. This is because peace making takes place not only at the track-one level of government-LTTE interaction, but also at the track-two and track-three levels, in which the rest of society is also deeply involved.

In particular, the UNP as the main opposition party and the ruling party at the time of the effective commencement of the peace process in February 2002, has a key role to play in ensuring that the process both remains on track and is speeded up. Its leader was the co-architect of the landmark CFA, as it widely known, and is a democratic leader in whom almost one half of the national electorate placed its trust at the last presidential election. Until partisan politics undermined his government, he demonstrated rapid progress in the peace process that was astonishing at the outset, before the weakening of his government. As such, Wickremesinghe has a powerful moral and political claim to be a co-determiner of the direction and expedience of the peace process.

As opposition and UNP leader, Wickremesinghe has repeatedly said that he will place no obstacle in the path of the government with respect to the peace process. He has also said that he will support any governmental initiative for peace that is within the parameters of the peace process as it has evolved since the signing of the CFA in 2002. But there is a further step he needs to consider: to join with the government as a partner in the peace process to ensure that the best decisions are made without unnecessary delay and procrastination. This task could be achieved either as a partner in a national government or as a partner outside a national government.

The jockeying for a position of strength by acts of direct violence and by using paramilitaries will not stop in the absence of a framework agreement on peace and democracy. Therefore, there will be no full adherence to the ceasefire and Geneva agreements until the government and the LTTE agree on a broad political framework. The political-framework agreement would set out the scope for economic development, and a transformation away from the rule of guns towards political control. In other words, an end to the deadlock in political talks is necessary. This may even be able to compensate for the deadlock in ceasefire talks.

A two-step approach is desirable in this context and needs to be taken on board in the future rounds of Geneva talks. In the first step, the government and the LTTE would agree on a joint mechanism to ensure that financial assistance for humanitarian relief and economic development is channelled to the north-east. This could be on the lines of the P-TOMS joint mechanism. The second step would be the establishment of an interim government for the north-east. If there is progress in agreeing on a joint economic mechanism as a starting point and on an interim government as a second step, implementing the ceasefire and Geneva agreements will become possible. The transformation of all armed entities into political ones must be the goal of the peace process.